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Joe the Ploughman Reads the 
Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public 
Meaning Originalism 
JACK N. RAKOVE*
Originalism is hot.  A couple of decades ago, one might have thought 
that its death knell had sounded when the Supreme Court nomination of
Robert Bork failed in the Senate.  Although one wondered exactly what
kind of originalism Justice Bork might have performed in practice, he 
was regarded as the theory’s leading academic spokesman, and the 
defeat of his nomination might have served as a fatal blow to the cause.
Within a few years, however, Justice Antonin Scalia published his 
lecture Originalism: The Lesser Evil,1 signaling that the cause remained
alive and well.  Although Justice Scalia’s views of the practice of 
originalism have also evolved—and in ways that embarrass originalism’s 
leading academic theorists2—his endorsement offered a more sophisticated
defense of the theory than had appeared, for example, in Attorney
* William Robertson Coe Professor of History and American Studies, and 
Professor of Political Science and (by courtesy) Law, Stanford University. This article is
an expanded version of the 25th Annual Nathaniel L. Nathanson Memorial Lecture, which I
presented at the University of San Diego School of Law in April 2009.  I am deeply grateful 
to Dean Kevin Cole for the invitation, to his colleagues for their hospitality, and to another
dean, my colleague and neighbor Larry Kramer, for his critical reading of the text. 
 1. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
2. See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1345 (2009) (denouncing Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller as
“an embarrassment for the interpretive approach that the Court purported to employ”); 
see also Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75
U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006) (evaluating Justice Scalia’s lecture Originalism: The Lesser Evil
and contending that Justice Scalia is not really an originalist at all). 
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General Edwin Meese’s public remarks on the subject.3  Today all
observers of the Supreme Court know that Justices Scalia and Thomas 
are avowed originalists.  Equally important, discussions of originalism 
flourish in law reviews, and the law school of this university has become
a high temple of originalist pronouncements and conferences.  To the
casual observer musing without a data count to rely upon, originalism 
appears to number among the liveliest—if not the liveliest—topics of
current writings in constitutional theory, and the effort to exploit it is no 
longer confined to a monopolistic pool of conservative academics.4 
Like any theory of textual interpretation, originalism has been subject 
to an array of refinements and criticisms, as well as elaborations of
methodology.  As a working historian, I do not feel wholly competent to
evaluate all of the theoretical nuances this discussion has produced,
much less predict where it will all end.  But I can still offer some 
comments based on my own efforts to develop a historically grounded
approach to the subject and to contrast that approach with the dominant
form of originalism being practiced today, which goes under the heading
of “public meaning” or “semantic” originalism.
Originalism is a subject that first attracted my interest when I was a 
graduate student studying history in the early 1970s.  It did so not as a 
topic I was actively studying but rather because a series of political
disputes, mostly revolving around the conduct of American foreign 
policy and the impeachment of Richard Nixon, engaged my interest as 
someone who was working on the political background to the 
Constitution.  As a member of an organization known as Reservists
Committee To Stop the War, I had a passing interest in its lawsuit
against Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, which sought to apply
Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 of the Constitution to require all members 
of Congress holding commissions in the Armed Forces Reserves to 
resign either their commissions or their seats.5  Fresh from reading my
graduate mentor Bernard Bailyn’s great book The Ideological Origins of 
the American Revolution, it seemed wholly plausible to me that our suit 
had the issue right—that the Framers of the Constitution would have 
regarded the placement of military officers in Congress as one of those 
marks of political corruption that had allowed the Crown to control the 
House of Commons, and that reform-minded Americans in the late 
 3. See Jack N. Rakove, Mr. Meese, Meet Mr. Madison, ATLANTIC, Dec. 1986, at
77, 77–78. 
4. Perhaps the articles collected in Symposium, Original Ideas on Originalism, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 491 (2009), present the best current guide to the state of play in this field. 
5. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209–11
(1974). 
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eighteenth century would have wanted to prohibit.6  A few years later,
the Court’s decision in Goldwater v. Carter7 got me thinking about how 
the adopters of the Constitution would have understood the legal 
character of treaties, which encouraged me to write my pioneering foray
into historical originalism, a discussion of the origins of the treaty power.8 
That essay, coupled with the rising public debate over originalism
generated by remarks by Attorney General Edwin Meese and Justice
William Brennan,9 in turn led me to write a whole book on the subject 
explicitly addressed not to assessing jurisprudential theories of originalism 
but to describing how a historian would attempt to answer what the
Constitution—or more specifically, its clauses—originally meant.10 
A historian’s answer to a query about the original meaning of a
constitutional clause need not depend on a prior understanding of the 
lawyers’ debate about originalism.  After all, historians ask what documents 
originally meant all the time.  Indeed, asking that question is the essence
of what we do, and the answers we provide often deal with both the 
original intentions of a document’s author(s) and the impact the document 
had on its recipients, whether a lone individual or a great social collective.11 
What would seem strange to a historian is not the idea of recovering the 
original meaning of a document, which we try to do all the time, but the 
greater ambition of originalism, which is to equate that original meaning, 
however ascertained, with a document’s permanent meaning. Documents,
6. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
47–51 (1967). 
7. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
8. See Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking
Clause as a Case Study, 1 PERSP. AM. HIST. 233 (1984). 
9. See Rakove, supra note 3, at 77–78 (discussing that although Attorney General 
Meese called for a return to “a jurisprudence of original intention,” Justice Brennan
objected to Meese’s position as “arrogance cloaked as humility” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
10. See  JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996); see also INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE 
DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990). 
11. The past generation or two of historical scholarship has been an extraordinarily
productive period in this respect, not least because of the enormous influence of the so-
called Cambridge School for writing the history of political ideas.  For its origins and 
legacy, the best place to begin would be with MEANING AND CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER
AND HIS CRITICS (James Tully ed., 1988), which includes several of Sir Quentin Skinner’s 
leading methodological essays.  One monument to this approach is the impressive series 
of monographs in intellectual history that Cambridge University Press publishes under the
heading Ideas in Context.  See, e.g., HANNAH DAWSON, LOCKE, LANGUAGE, AND EARLY-
MODERN PHILOSOPHY (2007). 
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once written, enter into the stream of historical time, and their meaning 
changes as those who come later ascribe their own understandings to the 
original text.  The meanings Americans now assign to the Declaration of 
Independence, to take one nontrivial example, have relatively little to do 
with the circumstances of its creation or Thomas Jefferson’s purposes, 
and everything to do with the ideas of equality that, inadvertently or 
otherwise, it eventually created.12 
Historians can therefore be originalists in their own way without
worrying too much about the lawyers’ rules for originalism.  But a historian 
who wants to contribute to the lawyers’ debate needs to know their 
premises and disputes.  When I set out to become an originalist, I took
counsel from both informed colleagues13 and an existing body of writings,
and I tried to make sense of how a historian’s approach might fit their 
problem.  The propositions that follow provided the initial framework 
for my thinking. 
First, originalism is the theory of constitutional interpretation that says
that the meaning of a constitutional text or provision is locked into it at
the moment of adoption, and the proper goal of constitutional 
interpretation is to ascertain and apply that meaning to the case at hand. 
In a republic in which the adoption of a constitutional text depends
directly on the authority of the people, knowing how a text was understood
by both ordinary citizens and their elected delegates and legislators 
matters more than the original intentions of its authors.
Second, in pursuing this mode of interpretation, the nominal objective 
is to constrain judicial decisionmaking, but the actual result may be to
liberate judges from the constraint of precedent.  Originalism is often 
described and justified as a means of preventing modern courts from 
imposing their moral preferences on cases because it requires justices
and judges to be faithful to the meaning of the constitutional text in its 
pure, unsullied form.  At the same time, an appeal to this particular sense
of high judicial duty can be enormously liberating in other respects 
because it allows courts to ignore well-grounded precedent in the pursuit 
of a vision of original constitutional meaning.  Whether originalism does 
more to constrain than liberate would be hard to measure.  Historical
answers may be just as indeterminate as other forms of legal reasoning, 
12. Compare  DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL
HISTORY 25–62 (2007) (stressing the Declaration of Independence’s international 
function), with  PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 154–208 (1997) (discussing, in the concluding chapter, the Declaration of
Independence’s later history). 
13. I owe personal debts of this kind to my Stanford colleagues Paul Brest and Thomas
Grey, and to an old graduate school friend then residing across the Bay, Robert Post, who
is now dean at the celebrated oracle of American constitutional theory, Yale Law School.
578
RAKOVE FINAL POST-AUTHOR PAGES TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/2011 11:59 AM      
 















    
  
   
  
 





   
 
    
  
   
  
 
[VOL. 48:  575, 2011] The Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
allowing judges to pick and choose the evidence that satisfies their 
predispositions.14 
Third, originalism, though primarily the business of judges, has both 
democratic and antidemocratic grounds.  Like other theories of judicial 
review, it rests upon the premise, originally laid down by Alexander 
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78, that when courts preserve the meaning 
of the Constitution against improper acts of government, they act in
behalf of the exercise of popular sovereignty that makes a written
constitution supreme law.15  That is democracy in a very high sense of 
the term.  Yet in other ways, a decision imposing the distilled will of a 
democratic sovereign from a distant constitutional past over the political 
preferences of modern democratic majorities seems to belie the whole 
promise (and premise) of popular government.  The reign of democracy
is an endless present in which majorities form, dissolve, and reform with
little knowledge of the past and less of the future.  As John Quincy 
Adams once memorably put it, “Democracy has no forefathers, it looks
to no posterity, it is swallowed up in the present and thinks of nothing 
but itself.”16  Whatever one makes of our culture’s fascination with the
founding generation—the literary phenomenon of “Founders chic”17— 
democratic culture is not patriarchal in nature. 
14. For an observation of this point, see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 5 (1988). 
15. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 524–30 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961). 
16. This comment appears as the epigraph to my concluding coda for Original 
Meanings.  See  RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 366.  Its original source for me was the 
lecture Democracy and the Past: Jefferson and His Heirs, which the late Professor Judith 
Shklar presented at Stanford as part of the Robert Wesson Lecture Series in April 1988.  The
lecture was subsequently printed as part of a collection in JUDITH N. SHKLAR, REDEEMING 
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (Stanley Hoffmann & Dennis F. Thompson eds., 1998). 
The quoted passage comes from a December 11, 1831 entry in the diary of John Quincy
Adams, and its immediate subject is whether a visiting Swiss collector will be able to sell 
to some American institution a small set of “ancient medals.”  Adams thinks he will not
find a buyer, and he goes on to complain: “Democracy has no monuments; it strikes no
medals; it bears the head of no man upon a coin; its very essence is iconoclastic.  This is the
reason why Congress have never been able to erect a monument to General 
Washington.”  8 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS DIARY 
FROM 1795 TO 1848, at 433 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co.
1876).  Times have evidently changed, and perhaps Adams’s observation should not be over-
generalized.  Still, I think its wisdom applies to something more than medals, and so did 
Professor Shklar. 
 17. See generally H.W. Brands, Founders Chic, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2003, 
at 101 (discussing a resurging interest in the Founding Fathers). 
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These strictures are essentially prefatory to determining what originalists 
would actually do in practice.  When I began thinking about the matter 
in the early 1980s, just before originalism became a public topic, it
seemed ineluctable that any serious approach to ascertaining the original 
meaning of a constitutional text or provision would have to be essentially 
historical in nature.  Of course, there was always the “law-office history”
version of doing things—meaning something like, “Look in The Federalist
and get me a cite,” or, “Did Madison say something about this?”  But I 
assumed one could develop higher standards that would involve 
identifying the relevant sources that could be brought to bear on a
question, considering the sources’ provenance and weighing their authority,
and assessing how and what each contributed to answering whatever
question was being posed.  What those sources are and how one should 
think about them will be discussed briefly below.  But the starting 
position demands emphasis now.  It is, quite simply, that the only possible
way in which one could satisfactorily reconstruct the original meaning of 
a constitutional text must necessarily involve an essentially historical
inquiry. Such an inquiry would have to take careful account of the 
sources, explaining how and why a document was drafted, debated, and 
finally approved.  It would involve immersion in the kinds of sources 
that historians ordinarily use and would need to consider the array of 
purposes shaping their action.  Whether it would ever produce dispositive 
answers on every problem could well be open to question.  Law school 
colleagues like the title of my book Original Meanings, in the plural. 
But such an approach should be able to produce more or less authoritative 
accounts of how and why particular provisions made their way into the 
constitutional text, thereby establishing interpretive baselines for both 
original meaning and subsequent interpretation and construction.
As I tried to think systematically about what a historically grounded
form of originalism would entail, my approach came to depend on three 
definitions and four sets of sources.  At the outset, I thought it was 
important to distinguish original meaning, intention, and understanding
from each other, rather than use those terms interchangeably or
promiscuously as synonyms for one endeavor.  Ascertaining the meaning of
a text is the goal of constitutional interpretation, and meaning therefore 
is best applied to the text itself.  One guide to that meaning could be the 
purposes of its authors—their intentions in including a particular
provision in the larger Constitution and the verbal choices they made in 
expressing their specific goals.  A classic example of this problem would
be the Constitutional Convention’s decision to replace the verb make
with declare in the clause establishing the power of Congress to authorize
580
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or initiate a war.18  Another could be the last minute, silent acceptance of 
Gouverneur Morris’s editorial condensation of the Vesting Clause of
Article II from two sentences into one.19  Original understanding, by
contrast, appeared to apply more aptly to the way in which the
Constitution was read by its ratifiers, which could refer both to the 
members of the state conventions and to the public they represented.  To 
speak of their intentions as a useful term in approving the Constitution
made little analytical sense because the only action the ratifiers could
literally take was to approve or reject the document in its entirety.  Their 
intentions, in other words, were sharply constrained by the structure of 
the decision the Convention and its Federalist supporters imposed on the
process of ratification.  Yet the evidence of how they understood the 
Constitution was also amply documented in the extant records of the 
ratification debates, now being reproduced in the twenty-one fat
volumes—with eight still to come—of The Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution.20 
Beyond these distinctions between the original meaning of the text,
the original intentions of its authors, and the original understandings of 
its ratifiers, there remained the separate, though hardly unrelated, question 
of sources.  Four sets of sources, broadly defined, seemed relevant to my
query.  Two of these have just been identified: (1) the documents that
bear directly on the intentions of the Framers, meaning the records of the 
debates at the Federal Convention of 1787, supplemented by collections 
of their personal papers; and (2) those that describe the ratification process 
of 1787–1790—counting the original rejecting states, North Carolina 
and Rhode Island, in the process—along with materials bearing on the 
adoption of the first ten amendments, all of which illustrate popular 
understandings of constitutional provisions. 
Two other sets of sources could be labeled as contextual.  These 
would involve bodies of evidence that set the intellectual and political 
background upon which the Framers and ratifiers acted.  One set seemed 
fairly obvious: the sources that shaped the vocabulary and grammar of
 18. See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 17, 1787), 
in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 314, 318–19 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1937). 
 19. See Report of Committee of Style (Sept. 12, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 18, at 590, 590–603. 
20. For the latest volume to be published, see 23 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009). 
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political discussion, or the traditions and texts that historians sometimes 
describe as political languages.  Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Harrington, 
Montesquieu, Hume, Blackstone, and other authorities would all have 
their place here.  So would other modes of reasoning associated, say,
with classical learning, or common law jurisprudence, or the Commonwealth
or Real Whig tradition for which Trenchard and Gordon remain the most 
representative figures.  Finally, one other set of sources appeared highly 
relevant to a historically grounded inquiry.  That would involve the real 
political world the Revolutionary generation inhabited—a world filled
with a dazzling array of public policy issues and disputes shaped by the 
hard course of events.  That, of course, is exactly the intellectual world I 
inhabited as a political historian of the Revolution, and it identified a 
setting where historians should be able to add layers of meaning that 
other scholars, especially the dilettantes in the law schools, would rarely
master.  The constitutionmakers of the late 1780s did not come to their 
task having labored solely in the realm of works of political theory and 
legal dictionaries.  They heralded instead from a decade of intense
involvement in public life, much of it predicated upon the task of
implementing the constitutions they originally wrote in the mid-1770s at 
both the state and national level of politics.  In this world, it might be the 
case that the construction of the foreign policy powers of the presidency 
owed as much to the Mississippi controversy of 1786 as it did to reading
Locke or Blackstone on the prerogative of the Crown.
The key point again was that I found it impossible to imagine how any 
account of original meaning could not be essentially historical in nature.
Perhaps it would not be wholly or solely historical in nature.  One could
imagine a linguistic exercise in which reliance on dictionaries, for 
example, would be helpful—although the fact that Americans produced 
no dictionaries until Noah Webster took up the task after the Revolution 
would also seem relevant.21  Even so, the idea that a constitutional text, 
itself the product of a supreme exercise of political decisionmaking by
both its framers and ratifiers, could be approached in ahistorical terms by
originalists struck me then, as it still does now, as oxymoronic.  Instead,
I enroll myself in the ranks of “simple-minded originalists,” to borrow 
Larry Alexander’s succinctly apt description, who stumble at the idea of 
preferring “a hypothetical author’s intended meaning (the meaning the 
21. Recall the old saying that Americans and Englishmen are two peoples divided by a
common language, which is why I would rather be redundant (repetitive) in California 
than redundant (unemployed) in Oxfordshire, which I have twice visited to teach in Stanford’s
program there.
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hypothetical member of the public would erroneously assume was intended 
by the actual authors) over the actual authors’ intended meaning.”22 
It has therefore come as something of a surprise to me to discover that 
the now-dominant form of originalism—public meaning or semantic 
originalism—has taken just the path I have disdained, eschewing the
value of reconstructing the historical context(s) in which the Constitution
was adopted in favor of a primarily linguistic exercise that reduces the 
use of sources that historians would turn to first in order to evade, not 
answer, the problems that dealing with those sources entails.  My account of
public meaning originalism may well be eligible for correction because
public meaning originalism appears to depend on nonsimple notions of 
linguistic meaning; and being a fact-obsessed historian, parts of the 
theory may lie beyond my conceptual grasp.23  What follows, nonetheless, 
is my understanding of what public meaning originalism entails.
The records of debates upon which historians would rely—whether 
relating to the framing of the Constitution at Philadelphia in 1787 or its
ratification by the states in 1787–1788—are simply inadequate to
providing an authoritative account of the original intentions of the
Framers and the understandings of the ratifiers of the Constitution.
There are too many gaps in the evidence, too many silences, and usually
too few voices to provide an adequate account of the original meaning of
the text.  Moreover, even if the sources were more complete, significant 
collective action problems would make it impossible to satisfy the 
standards of certainty that originalists would hope to obtain.  Having 
evidence of what was being debated without being able to resolve 
conclusively the grounds on which these debates were resolved would 
not go far enough to satisfy the originalists’ desire for interpretive certainty. 
Historians could be content with this level of description because they
have no legal issues to resolve; originalist jurists could not. 
 22. Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM:
ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Grant Huscroft & Bradley Miller eds., forthcoming 
2011) (manuscript at 4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1235722. 
23. I am, however, deeply grateful to Randy Barnett, Keith Whittington, and (primus 
inter pares) Larry Solum for their efforts to explain the theory to me over pizza in Chicago 
during an October 2009 conference we jointly attended—even though I remain somewhat 
surprised to have observed later that Solum and Barnett could merely split a single apple 
pancake between them at Walker Brothers Original Pancake House, which must be another 
version of what Barnett elsewhere calls faint-hearted originalism.  Any failure in my depiction 
of public meaning originalism is due to my conceptual inadequacies, and perhaps a whimsical
authorial mood, rather than any shortcomings in their efforts. 
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Public meaning originalism thus abandons the idea that the Constitution
is to be understood or approached primarily as the outcome of a set of 
political deliberations.  As true as that proposition may (indeed must) be 
historically, it is insufficient legally.  Instead, public meaning originalists
treat the Constitution primarily as a legal text, and their interpretive goal 
is to understand how an informed reader of the time would have 
understood the legal commands it issued.  That understanding cannot be 
the product of active political engagement in the process from which the 
Constitution was produced.  It supposes instead that the imagined reader
of the past exists in a disinterested world, detached from political
commitments.  His goal instead is to make a good faith effort to interpret
the text in question, and this exercise is first and foremost a linguistic act. 
We want to imagine this reader—and imagine seems to be operatively
correct here—as an honest citizen interested in interpreting the 
Constitution with the best resources available but free of any political
engagements to the Federalist or Antifederalist side, which would return
us to the collective action problem of asking how public opinion could be 
most accurately represented.24 
Exactly who this imaginary reader is nonetheless remains something 
of a mystery, especially for historians who work only with really existing 
figures from the past.  For want of a better term, our putative interpreter
of the Constitution deserves a name, and in a spirit of political bonhomie,
we may christen him Joe the Ploughman in un petit homage to Samuel
Joseph Wurzelbacher, the legendary Joe the Plumber of 2008 election
fame.  Dropping into his humble farmhouse one day—where of course 
there was no plumbing—we look on Joe’s shelves to discover what
literary resources he had ready to hand.  If his background were firmly
Protestant, a Bible and Foxe’s Book of Martyrs would be good bets, though 
how these would help Joe in the realm of constitutional interpretation 
seems a puzzle; perhaps reading Foxe would encourage him to wonder, 
as John Locke had doubted a century earlier,25 whether the free exercise 
of religion should extend to Catholics at all.  A set of almanacs would 
come in handy, particularly if the weather were concerned.  If Mrs. Joe,
24. My colleague Dean Larry Kramer has suggested to me, however, that this treatment
may err in treating the putative public meaning originalist as a citizen, when his preferred 
identification should be an eighteenth-century jurist.  That may be a fair criticism, and if 
so, it exposes my limitations as a reader of the contemporary originalist debate.  On the other 
hand, how we think about the intellectual characteristics of such a jurist would itself remain a
suitable problem for historical reconstruction; a definition based on modern usage and practice 
cannot simply be applied to our construction of the interpretive identity of this 
imagined eighteenth-century judge.  But for a far more sophisticated account of this identity, 
see PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008). 
25. See  JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY ON TOLERATION (1667), reprinted in LOCKE:
POLITICAL ESSAYS 134, 152 (Mark Goldie ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1977). 
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his wife, liked to read novels, Richardson’s Pamela or Clarissa would
be a prize possession.26  We would be better off, though, if we could
suppose that our imaginary reader had a copy of Sir William Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England at hand.  “I have been told by an 
eminent bookseller, that in no branch of his business, after tracts of
popular devotion, were so many books as those on the law exported to
the plantations,” Edmund Burke told the House of Commons in March
1775.27  “The colonists have now fallen into the way of printing them for
their own use.  I hear that they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone’s
Commentaries in America as in England.”28 
Yet in constructing Joe the Ploughman’s literary identity, why would 
we want to rely solely on works like these?  Someone reading the
Constitution in 1787–1788—a citizen engaged in the original effort to 
ascertain its original meaning—likely would have joined the intense
political debates that preoccupied concerned Americans.  The citizen
also probably would have read the political literature of the Revolutionary
era.  Of course, for the purposes of public meaning originalism, perhaps 
Joe would be better qualified had he ignored those debates entirely.
Ignoring what his compatriots were arguing about presumably would 
place him in a better position to judge the meaning of the Constitution 
solely on the basis of its linguistic attributes, as opposed to the political 
noise surrounding its adoption.  Yet that would leave us in another 
awkward position, assuming that independent, undecided, or median
voters—or better, those who proved too lazy to vote at all—would be the 
optimal readers of the text.  If one worries that such voters or citizens 
may often be the least committed or knowledgeable of all, there may be 
some reason to doubt that they provide the ideal type of disinterested
reader that public meaning originalism desires.
26. See, for example, the following excerpt from the private writings of Esther
Edwards Burr, daughter of Jonathan Edwards and mother of Aaron Burr, Jr., dated March
12, 1755: 
I am quite angry with Mr. Fielding. He has degraded our sex most horridly, to 
go and represent such virtue as Pamela, falling in love with Mr. B in the midst
of such foul and abominable actions.  I could never pardon him if he had not 
made it up in Clarissia. 
THE JOURNAL OF ESTHER EDWARDS BURR 1754–1757, at 99 (Carol F. Karlsen & Laurie 
Crumpacker eds., 1984) (footnote omitted).  To clarify, Burr confused Henry Fielding with 
Samuel Richardson. Id. at n.12. 
27. Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies (Mar. 22, 1775), in
1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 3, 4 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
28. Id.
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For historians, however, the fundamental problem with the idea of Joe 
the Ploughman stems from the basic matter of definition.  In the end, the 
imaginary disinterested original reader of the Constitution remains 
nothing more nor less than a creature of the modern originalist jurist’s
imagination.  What other existence can that reader possibly have?  The 
reader’s projected understanding of the Constitution will be cobbled 
together arbitrarily from some set of sources that true original readers
might not have possessed or used in the way imagined and that can only 
be the product of a modern intelligence creating a figure who did not
exist.  All historical thinking, on the contrary, begins with the supposition
that we are bound in our statements about the past to evidence of what its
inhabitants actually said and thought.  That is the cruel tyranny imposed by
the historian’s respect for the authority of documents.  An imaginary 
originalist reader who never existed historically can never be a figure 
from the past; the reader remains only a fabrication of a modern mind. 
How the existence of such a figure can offer a constraint on the excesses
of judicial discretion seems equally a fabrication as well.  It is, in effect,
a legal fiction in a novel sense of the term.
A different and arguably more disturbing kind of legal fiction also
figures in the defects of public meaning originalism. All disputes about 
the proper interpretation of the Constitution rest on the entirely correct 
and textually demonstrable proposition that the Constitution is law, 
indeed the supreme law of the land, as the Supremacy Clause explicitly
reminds us.  Moreover, the interpretations that matter most in our
governance are those that emerge from courts of law, which reinforces 
the idea that the act of interpretation is essentially legalistic in nature, 
even when we suspect that the prior political commitments of judges and
justices often shape, if they do not indeed determine, outcomes.  Yet to 
concede that the Constitution is necessarily a legal text is not the same 
thing as saying it is solely a legal text, or even that its legal meaning is 
its paramount characteristic.  A historian would rather say that the
determination to ensure that the Constitution of 1787 would be treated as 
fundamental law was itself one of the major outcomes of the process of
constitutional experimentation that began in 1776 and culminated in the 
late 1780s.  But that determination alone neither exhausts nor eclipses 
the other dimensions of constitutionmaking that were equally part of that 
process.  Once these other dimensions are taken into account, the fiction
of the imaginary disinterested reader as an authoritative guide to
constitutional meaning becomes more problematic still. 
It would indeed be a curious conception of American constitutionalism to
conclude that, for interpretive purposes, the best way to read the text is
to divorce oneself from the history that produced it.  The marvel of the 
Constitution, after all, is that it was produced by exceptional and 
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unprecedented debates that were conducted by a group of statesmen who 
were deeply self-conscious of the historical significance of what they
were doing.  Nor was the adoption of the Constitution the work of a 
select group of lawgivers alone.  For in many respects, the process of 
securing an effective popular approval of the Constitution within less 
than a year of ample public debate is an equally remarkable part of the 
story—as we now know better, and in greater detail, with the publication 
of Pauline Maier’s recent volume Ratification: The People Debate the 
Constitution.29  A similar judgment applies equally well to the
Reconstruction debates that produced the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments.  Comparable stories, though less dramatic,
attach to all of the other provisions that make up the constitutional text,
down to the half-comic tale that explains how the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment was allowed to make its way into the Constitution a mere
two centuries after it was originally proposed.  None of these deliberations 
were conducted under the assumption that the best way to ascertain the 
meaning of the text would be to imagine how an anonymous, informed, 
but politically noncommitted member of the American public would 
read its language.  As William Nelson has argued in one specially important 
case, the best way to read the Fourteenth Amendment might require
understanding that its authors favored some levels of generality in the 
text because they had to take into account its likely impact on Republican
politicians in the North.30 Alternatively, it might be the case, as Akhil 
Amar has argued, that the best reading of the Fourteenth Amendment
depends on knowing that its key framers were all Barron contrarians— 
meaning that they believed the Supreme Court’s 1833 decision31 holding
that the Bill of Rights applied only against the federal government had
been mistaken all along.32  In either case, whatever the difficulties imposed
by any collective action reading of framing or ratification, the result still
29. See  PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 
1787–1788 (2010). 
30. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL 
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 51–53 (1988). 
31. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833) (“We are of opinion 
that the provision in the fifth amendment to the constitution . . . is intended solely
as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not
applicable to the legislation of the states.”)
 32. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
145–46 (1998). 
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seems more likely to illustrate the really existing meaning of the
Constitution than the public meaning alternative. 
Thus far I have juxtaposed a historicist understanding of the
Constitution against one that can be labeled linguistic in nature.  In 
effect, readers are asked to choose between two rival approaches: one
grounded firmly in the records of debates, explicitly acknowledging their 
political character and willing to concede that a narrowing of possible 
meanings may be the more likely result than one dispositive interpretation;
the other based on a linguistic approach to the nature of meaning.  But 
historians hardly can be obtuse to the nature of language itself.  They 
may not have broad theories of how language works, and they can
happily pass their lives without worrying how much allegiance they owe 
to the work of Chomsky, Austin, Wittgenstein, or Donald Grice—the 
last being the one philosopher of language who appears to be exerting 
the greatest influence over public meaning originalism.33 But an awareness
that the meaning of words changes conventionally with usage is an
assumption that historians have to carry with them, lest they plunge
precipitously into the traps of anachronism, or worse, fail to detect
changes in their objects of study.  Nor can historians of events that were
clearly as politically creative as those of the Revolutionary era avoid 
asking what happened to key terms of political discourse, with little terms 
that bedevil us still, such as constitution or executive power or declare
war or establishment of religion, not to forget the ever-popular to keep
and bear arms or militia.  It is one thing, after all, to suppose that words 
fraught with political content retain a relatively fixed meaning in quiet 
times, but it is quite another to apply that assumption to a period like the
late 1780s or the Revolutionary era more generally.  In rerum natura, 
constitutionmaking itself may offer a supreme example of how political
concepts—fine instances of what John Locke called “mixed modes” in
Book III of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding34—acquire
whatever meaning they may obtain through processes of collective
deliberation that themselves subject prior understandings of terms to further 
refinement.
33. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 947–51 (2009).  I profess great intellectual respect for Solum’s 
careful development of arguments on the nature of language, meaning, and the like.  At the 
same time, if given a choice between imagining jurists having to master modern academic
theories of language or immersing them in the sources from the Revolutionary era—asking
them to know Madison and Hamilton, say, better than Grice—I will stick with my eighteenth-
century friends.
 34. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 428–33 (Peter 
H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1689) (discussing his theory on mixed modes). 
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To illustrate this point, consider two nontrivial terms that remain essential
to any serious discussion of constitutional interpretation: the key word
constitution itself, and the term executive power, which the opening 
sentence of Article II vests in a single President of the United States.35 
Americans talked about constitutions often during the Revolutionary 
era, from their initial skirmishes of 1765–1766 over Parliament’s claims
of authority to tax and legislate for them “in all cases whatsoever,”36 
through the adoption of the first state constitutions of 1776, the reactions 
against their errors, and on to the great national discussion of the late 
1780s.  Several evidentiary “data points” from this period suggest the 
difficulties involved.  In his “Clarendon” essays of 1766, John Adams 
struggled to explain how Americans could invoke the “true” or “real 
constitution” of the empire of which they were a part.  Because there was
no text of a constitution to invoke for either Britain itself or its empire, 
Adams found himself deploying metaphors instead to explain what the 
term really meant, comparing the imperial constitution to both the human
body and a machine (a clock) to give the term a meaning it would otherwise 
lack.37 A decade later, when Americans began drafting constitutions,
they had to distinguish the documents they were adopting from the prior 
constitutional tradition from which they were adopting.  As one
polemical author—possibly Thomas Paine, but the point is 
controversial38—asserted, whereas the British had been mistaken to 
think they actually possessed a constitution, the rebellious Americans 
now enjoyed an opportunity to produce a better definition of the term. 
The last of the Four Letters on Interesting Subjects opens with a bold 
but eminently sensible claim: “Among the many publications which
have appeared on the subject of political Constitutions, none, that I have 
seen, have properly defined what is meant by a Constitution, that word
having been bandied about without any determinate sense being affixed
thereto.”39  The Americans were now in a position to make a fresh start, 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
36. Declaratory Act, 1766, 6 Geo. 3, c. 12 (Gr. Brit.), available at http://avalon.
law.yale.edu/18th_century/declaratory_act_1766.asp. 
 37. John Adams, The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym, BOS. GAZETTE, Jan. 27, 
1766, reprinted in JACK N. RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS 55, 55–61 (1998). 
38. The suggestion that Paine authored Four Letters on Interesting Subjects was made 
in A. OWEN ALDRIDGE, THOMAS PAINE’S AMERICAN IDEOLOGY 219–39 (1984).  I consider the
attribution plausible but unconfirmed. 
39. FOUR LETTERS ON INTERESTING SUBJECTS 18–24 (1776), reprinted in 1 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 637, 637. 
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distinguishing a true constitution from a mere “form of government”; but 
for our purposes, it is the “bandied about” remark that suffices as
evidence of underlying linguistic uncertainty. 
The best evidence for this point comes, however, from Thomas
Jefferson, in a well-known passage from his Notes on the State of 
Virginia.  While Jefferson was stuck in Philadelphia writing the
Declaration of Independence, he really wanted to be back in Virginia 
contributing to the drafting of the Virginia Constitution.40  Having lost 
that opportunity, Jefferson remained critical of various facets of the 
Commonwealth’s new constitution, and his criticism extended to the
mode of its adoption.  When he drafted his Notes on the State of Virginia
in the early 1780s, Jefferson made this uncertainty about the legal status
of the constitution an essential charge in his appeal for reform, and his 
passage deserves quotation at length.  Writing in opposition to the 
defenders of the constitution, he noted that: 
They urge, that if the convention had meant that this instrument should be alterable, 
as their other ordinances were, they would have called it an ordinance: but they
have called it a constitution, which [by force of the term] means ‘an act above 
the power of the ordinary legislature.’  I answer that constitutio, constitutum, statutum,
lex, are convertible terms.  [A constitution is called that which is made by the 
ruler.  An ordinance, that which is rewritten by emperors or ordained.  A statute
is called the same as law.] Constitution and statute were originally terms of the 
civil law, and from thence introduced by Ecclesiastics into the English law.  Thus in
the statute 25. Hen. 8. c. 19. §. I. ‘Constitutions and ordinances’ are used as
synonimous.  The term constitution has many other significations in physics and
in politics; but in Jurisprudence, whenever it is applied to any act of the legislature, it
invariably means a statute, law, or ordinance, which is the present case.  No inference
then of a different meaning can be drawn from the adoption of this title: on the
contrary, we might conclude, that, by their affixing to it a term synonimous with 
ordinance, or statute, they meant it to be an ordinance or statute.  But of what
consequence is their meaning, where their power is denied?41 
Jefferson’s critique was, of course, part of the broader movement required
to produce a new American understanding of exactly what a constitution 
was—an expression of supreme fundamental law, not a description of a 
form of government—and how it attained that status—by being adopted
 40. See JACK RAKOVE, REVOLUTIONARIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE INVENTION OF
AMERICA 157–97 (2010), for my account of the first state constitutions.  Of course, like 
all historians, I have relied on GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1969), for the broader story.
 41. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1787), reprinted in
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 123, 248–49 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (footnote 
omitted). For a broader discussion of this issue, see RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 94–130;
Gerald Stourzh, Constitution: Changing Meanings of the Term from the Early 
Seventeenth to the Late Eighteenth Century, in  CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE
CONSTITUTION 35, 35–54 (Terence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds., 1988); WOOD, supra note
40, at 259–305. 
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through a specially elected convention, rather than a legislature, and then
securing popular ratification as well. 
Any attempt to define constitution independently of the political 
discussions and developments that took place after 1765—on the basis,
say, of previously conventional British usage—would necessarily be 
defective not merely as an exercise in definitions but as a failure to
understand how political events and debates would have led any citizen
intelligently involved in this process to rethink the prior understanding— 
and it is noteworthy that one of the earliest statements of the emerging 
American theory of a constitution came from the townspeople of 
Concord, Massachusetts, as early as October 1776.42 One could make a 
similar case for another pregnant phrase, executive power, which has 
figured prominently in modern discussions of the nature and extent of 
presidential authority based on the authority ascribed to the Vesting
Clause of Article II.  We should know, as legislative historians, that that 
clause appeared in two distinct forms at Philadelphia in 1787.  The original
version, produced by the Committee of Detail in early August, now 
seems quaintly worded.  The Committee proposed that “[t]he Executive 
Power of the United States shall be vested in a single person.  His stile 
shall be, ‘The President of the United States of America;’ and his title 
shall be, ‘His Excellency.’”43  In early September, that language, unaltered,
went to the Committee of Style, which meant the editorial pen of
Gouverneur Morris, and it emerged in a more concise form, which the 
Convention approved without discussion, in the clause we now love and
vehemently dispute: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America.”44 
One could speculate whether the deletion of the phrase “of the United
States” after “executive power” was meant to transform a peculiarly
republican form of executive power, distinct to the United States, into a 
bolder vision of executive power tied, for instance, to the known prerogative
of the British Crown.  If so, one would also expect that the Framers 
might at least have discussed this point because consequential results 
would flow from it.  That they made no comment on the revision indicates
that they would have perceived the change as merely editorial, not
42. See Resolution of Concord, Massachusetts, October 21, 1776, BOS. GAZETTE, 
Oct. 29, 1776, reprinted in DECLARING RIGHTS, supra note 37, at 74, 74–75. 
43. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 6, 1787), in 2
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 18, at 176, 185. 
 44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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substantive. But anyone interested in how the Framers thought about 
executive power would also want to answer that question in terms of the 
broader legislative history of how the presidency was constructed in
1787.  The historian who wishes to explain how the presidency emerged 
from what Madison characterized as “tedious and reiterated discussions”45 
soon learns that the Framers did not have one handy model of executive
power at hand but wrestled down to their final days of debate with the
difficult task of constructing a national republican executive for which they
discovered no useful precedents.46 
The beginnings of this process would also reveal that the Framers 
agreed that they had to formulate their own definition of executive
power at the outset.  Article 7 of the Virginia Plan proposed “that a 
National Executive be instituted . . . and that besides a general authority 
to execute the National laws, it ought to enjoy the Executive rights 
vested in Congress by the Confederation.”47  When this clause was 
debated, James Wilson objected to the latter set of powers, noting that 
“the Prerogatives of the British Monarch” were not “a proper guide in 
defining the Executive powers” because “[s]ome of these prerogatives
were of a Legislative nature” while others were “of war & peace &c.”48 
Wilson cited the authority of “Writers on the Laws of Nations” to
support this view.49  James Madison, though himself the principal author
of the Virginia Plan, seconded Wilson, noting that “executive powers ex
vi termini, do not include the Rights of war & peace &c.”50 
This debate illustrates a fundamental point.  Although Wilson’s reference 
to prior authorities on the law of nations indicates that knowledge of the
background intellectual history was relevant to the project, the debate as 
a whole also suggests that the definition of executive power remained a 
source of controversy.  Someone relying on the conventional British 
conception of the prerogative powers of the Crown—another obvious 
source of a definition—would not be well positioned to square that prior 
45. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in  JAMES
MADISON: WRITINGS 142, 144 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). 
46. For my account of this process, see RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 244–87. 
47. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 18, at 17, 21 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911). 
48. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 1, 1787), in 1 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 18, at 64, 65–66 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911). 
49. William Pierce, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 1, 1787), in 1 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 18, at 73, 73–74 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911). 
50. Rufus King, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 1, 1787), in 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 18, at 70, 70 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1911). 
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definition with the republican ideas that had flourished in America since
1776 but that the Framers of the Constitution were also in the process of
modifying.  Did executive power, as Americans used the term, retain a 
robust element of prerogative or not?  No attempt to answer this or 
related questions could possibly succeed on the basis of existing
definitions if it did not actively analyze the multiple ways in which
Americans spoke about executive power after 1776.
All of this is simply to restate the historian’s obvious point.  When one 
is dealing with a period as politically and intellectually creative as the 
Revolutionary era obviously was, one could not possibly understand
what the adopters of the Constitution were doing without reconstructing 
their debates in some detail.  One would also have to recognize that the 
use of political language, like other forms of speech, is necessarily
creative, and that key words develop and acquire new shades of meaning 
precisely because they are subjected to the pressures of active controversy. 
The adopters of the Constitution inhabited a world that was actively
concerned with the nature of language, or more to the point, the instability
of linguistic meanings, and commentators on the ratification debates have
observed the extent to which arguments about the definitions of key
words and concepts were themselves central elements of political debate.
As Gordon Wood once observed in one of his many brilliant aperçus, the
Federalists’ account of the Constitution left their opponents “holding 
remnants of thought that had lost their significance.”51 
Nor would this observation itself surprise many of the original adopters 
of the Constitution, which in turn supports one final criticism of public
meaning originalism.  Simply put, it shows no interest in how inhabitants of
the eighteenth century thought about these issues of political language.
That question does not seem to matter, even though that concern might
be deemed relevant to an inquiry into how the problem of constitutional 
interpretation was originally understood.  There is no place in this story, 
for example, for the one comment from the constitutional debates of 
1787–1788 that historians might regard as most relevant to the current 
debate.  This is a famous passage from The Federalist No. 37, in which
Madison attempted to explain why constitutionmaking was so difficult a 
task and to compare the necessary uncertainties of political reasoning 
with other forms of knowledge.  “Besides the obscurity arising from the 
 51. WOOD, supra note 40, at 524. 
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complexity of objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties,” 
Madison observed, summarizing two previous epistemological difficulties, 
the medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other, adds 
a fresh embarrassment. The use of words is to express ideas.  Perspicuity therefore 
requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly formed, but that they should
be expressed by words distinctly and exclusively appropriated to them. But no
language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, 
or so correct as not to include many equivocally denoting different ideas.  Hence, it
must happen, that however accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, 
and however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition of them
may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered.
And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the complexity
and novelty of the objects defined.  When the Almighty himself condescends to
address mankind in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must 
be, is rendered dim and doubtful, by the cloudy medium through which
it is communicated.52 
Readers of this passage familiar with the relevant historical and
philosophical sources will immediately recognize the source of Madison’s 
ideas.  Madison was concisely distilling major elements of John Locke’s 
discussion of language in Book III of the Essay Concerning Human
Understanding.  That radical criticism of the fallibility of language 
expressed by Locke continued to frame, even dominate, eighteenth-
century discussions.  It contributed to the efforts of eighteenth-century
Anglo-Americans to give their common tongue a fixity it seemed to lack, 
inspiring numerous efforts to produce works of grammar and dictionaries 
that would provide English with greater stability.53 
Reading Madison in the light of Locke can lead to some striking
conclusions, especially if one understands Locke as his writings have 
recently been presented by a young English scholar, Hannah Dawson, in 
work that makes plain just how radical Locke’s assault on the fixity of 
language actually was.54 Writing with a remarkable literary verve and 
personal engagement one rarely encounters in a subject of this nature, 
Dawson brilliantly describes the depth of Locke’s concern with “semantic 
instability”55 and how much further he went than any of his predecessors 
in confronting the difficulty of making words attain the “perspicuity”56 
—the accuracy and clarity—that he, like Madison a century later, desired. 
Locke, in Dawson’s account, is relentlessly drawn back to the subjectivity 
 52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 15, at 236–37 (James Madison).
 53. JOHN HOWE, LANGUAGE AND POLITICAL MEANING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA
13–37 (2004). 
54. See generally DAWSON, supra note 11 (discussing language in the context of
Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding); Hannah Dawson, Locke on Language 
in (Civil) Society, 26 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 397 (2005) (discussing the impact that Locke’s 
philosophy on language had on his political beliefs). 
 55. DAWSON, supra note 11, at 129–53. 
56. Id. at 218. 
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with which ordinary users of language ascribe meaning to text, especially 
when they are dealing with the mixed modes, where the human mind is
free to group ideas together in complex relations that do not wholly
correspond to observations of substances in nature.57  Locke understood
that his broad concerns about semantic instability extended to law and
religion just as readily as they did to other realms of discourse.58  “Locke’s
contingent, readerly view of meaning seems sometimes to shake the 
authority of the law and the Bible,” Dawson observes.59  “They are not 
necessarily the public and fixed standards by which we know how to 
order our lives.”60 
No doubt Locke is much less an authority for modern understandings
of language than Donald Grice, and perhaps only a pure historicist like 
me might think that his concerns, as absorbed by Madison, remain
relevant to our own.  Still, as a closing example from the Supreme Court’s
most recent and self-confessed avowal of public meaning originalism,
the majority opinion written by Justice Scalia in District of Columbia v.
Heller61 suggests that Locke’s and Madison’s worries about semantic 
instability should not be casually dismissed.  Indeed, if one wishes to
find a perfect example of why Locke and Madison were right to worry 
about the slippery nature of political language, Justice Scalia’s verbal 
sleight of hand in Heller, nominally waged in behalf of public meaning 
originalism, is a great place to begin.
Consider two passages from Justice Scalia’s opinion, one dealing with 
the role of legislative history in constitutional adjudication, the other 
with the substantive question of whether the Constitution ever recognizes a
collective people, rather than individual persons, as rights bearers.  Both 
should alarm anyone who believes that history has a role to play in 
constitutional adjudication or who is rash enough to think that jurists, 
like constitution writers, have some obligation to use language carefully.
“It is always perilous,” Justice Scalia observes, “to derive the meaning 
of an adopted provision from another provision deleted in the drafting 
process.”62  Let us start with that opening phrase, “always perilous.” 
Literally speaking, this cannot possibly be true; indeed, it verges on the 
57. Id. at 224. 
 58. LOCKE, supra note 34, at 480. 
 59. DAWSON, supra note 11, at 214–15. 
60. Id. at 215. 
61. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
62. Id. at 590. 
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absurd.  Always would mean without exception, yet surely there are 
some occasions when it is indeed helpful to know that one term has been 
substituted for another.  No responsible commentator could discuss the 
origins of the War Powers Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, 
for example, without noting that the Framers substituted declare for
make in the clause defining congressional authority over the initiation of
war.63  Sometimes legislative history will demonstrate that the Framers
of a clause preferred a more ambiguous formulation over a more specific 
one, strongly implying that some leeway for interpretation or construction 
was consciously being left to those who would come later.64 Always
therefore cannot possibly mean always. 
An even stronger objection lies against the word it modifies.  Perilous
means “full of or involving peril,”65 and peril means “exposure to the
risk of being injured, destroyed, or lost,” or “something that imperils.”66 
Used in this sense, it is difficult, though hardly perilous, to see how an
effort to trace the legislative history of a constitutional provision could 
ever risk consequences so grave.  It does no harm to consider, as Justice
Scalia then goes on to do, whether the deletion of the phrase “but no 
person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to
render military service in person” is illustrative of the purpose of the 
Second Amendment or not.67  It may well be problematic to weigh the
importance of such a deletion, but surely it always is informative to 
consider how a turnip of a text from which interpretive blood must be 
extracted—speaking figuratively, of course—took the form it did. 
This first objection might seem frivolous, though it does illustrate how 
Justice Scalia’s aversion to legislative history in statutory construction 
passes over into his constitutional jurisprudence as well.  The second 
passage, however, bears more closely on the substance of reading a 
constitutional text.  Here Justice Scalia attempts to evade the idea that 
when the Constitution identifies the people as the bearer of rights, that 
need not necessarily mean all persons: 
Three provisions of the Constitution refer to “the people” in a context other
than “rights”—the famous preamble (“We the people”), § 2 of Article I (providing 
that “the people” will choose members of the House), and the Tenth Amendment
(providing that those powers not given the Federal Government remain with 
“the States” or “the people”).  Those provisions arguably refer to “the people” acting 
collectively—but they deal with the exercise or reservation of powers, not rights. 
63. See Madison, supra note 18, at 318–19. 
64. A notable example would be the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
 65. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 920 (11th ed. 2003). 
66. Id.
67. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 589. 
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Nowhere else in the Constitution does a “right” attributed to “the people” refer
to anything other than an individual right.68 
Which word merits special attention in this passage?  The obvious choice
must be powers in the second sentence.  It does the heavy—or one could 
say shifty—work of explaining why two rather substantive provisions of
the original Constitution that seem to recognize the existence of 
collective rights, vested in the entity of “the people” rather than individual 
persons, do no such thing.  These provisions therefore need not contravene
Justice Scalia’s prior claim that on the two other occasions when “[t]he
unamended Constitution and the Bill of Rights use the phrase ‘right of 
the people’”—in the Petition and Assembly and the Search and Seizure 
Clauses—“these instances unambiguously refer to individual rights, not
‘collective’ rights, or rights that may be exercised only through participation
in some corporate body.”69 
Is there anything objectionable in classifying the “We the People” of 
the Preamble and the people who elect the lower house of Congress in
Article I, Section 2 as powers, not rights?  Indeed there is, and it takes
only a moment’s historical reflection to determine why.  It is difficult to 
imagine that anyone possessing any familiarity with eighteenth-century
political discourse—again, not the imaginary musings of Joe the Ploughman
but really existing republican constitutionalists—would suppose that 
Justice Scalia’s usage would pass its linguistic muster.  The “We the 
People” of the Preamble is manifestly an expression or instantiation of a 
people’s fundamental right, proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, 
“to alter or to abolish [governments], and to institute new government, 
laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in
such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and 
happiness.”70  The same thought is repeated in numerous other constitutional
68. Id. at 579–80. 
69. Id. at 579.  One might object, however, that the use of the conjunction and in
the Assembly and Petition Clause makes it a collective right, not to be reduced to the
traditional right of individuals or private associations to petition legislative assemblies for
some legal favor or the resolution of some dispute.  Here, again, the legislative history,
far from being always perilous to consider, might seem highly pertinent because the 
discussion of the clause in the House of Representatives in 1789 centered on proposals to
add a provision explicitly authorizing the people to issue instructions to their representatives. 
See Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 611–21 (1999).  Such a right could
only be exercised collectively. It would make no sense to say that I have a right to
instruct my representative.
 70. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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documents of the era, notably in the declarations of rights that accompanied
the first state constitutions.  Here the common formula, as expressed, for 
example, in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, holds that “the 
people alone have an incontestible, unalienable, and indefeasible right to 
institute government; and to reform, alter, or totally change the same, 
when their protection, safety, prosperity and happiness require it.”71 
Whatever power the people may legitimately exercise in adopting a new 
government is dependent upon the prior possession of their right “to 
alter and abolish” an old government; otherwise, their assertion of that
power would always be subversion.  Interestingly, in his June 8, 1789
speech introducing amendments to the Constitution, Representative 
James Madison included a comparable statement in the first set of three
provisions that he proposed to prefix to the Constitution and then noted 
that this introductory article “relate[d] to what may be called a bill of 
rights.”72 
One could similarly object to Justice Scalia’s categorization of the 
election of the House of Representatives as a power of the people rather
than a right.  True, Article I, Section 2 does not speak expressly of the 
right to vote.  It simply says that the lower house shall be “chosen . . . by
the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have 
the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of 
the State Legislature.”73  Acknowledging the full force of this provision
is always perilous to those who allege that our Constitution speaks only 
of personal rights or equates the rights of the people with the rights of all 
persons.  The plain meaning of the text is that the right of representation 
vests in the people collectively, yet the positive exercise of that right can
be legally limited to whichever section of the population state legislatures 
recognize as qualified to hold it.  It requires no leap of constitutional
construction to conclude that a popular right to keep and bear arms could
similarly reside only in some members of the population, depending on
 71. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 1, art. VII, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 7, 8.  In the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, this 
“indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right” vests in “a majority of the community.”  
VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. III, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 27, at 3, 3.  Pennsylvania uses the same wording and vests the right  simply 
in “the community.”  PA. CONST. OF 1776, art. V, reprinted in  5 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 6, 7.  The enduring significance of this right is the main 
theme of CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S 
ONSTITUTIONAL RADITION EFORE THE IVIL ARC T B C W  (2008). 
72. James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in
DECLARING RIGHTS, supra note 37, at 170, 175.  “That the people have an indubitable, 
unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their government, whenever it be 
found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution.”  Id. at 173. 
 73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
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their fitness to serve in a militia that Congress is given the constitutional 
authority to organize, arm, and discipline.74 
Justice Scalia’s abuse of these terms thus suggests that John Locke 
was indeed onto some serious issues with the misuse of language and 
that James Madison shared Locke’s concerns when he explained why 
words were as much a problem as a solution to constitutional disputes. 
The answer to this problem, Madison thought, was to do as much as one 
could to secure some measure of fixity in constitutional meanings.  Part
of that endeavor involved attempting to use the original understanding of
the Constitution, as voiced in the ratification debates of 1787–1788, as 
an essential source of meaning, which is exactly why Madison can be
regarded as a founding father of originalism.  This was the concluding
theme of his April 6, 1796 speech on the Jay Treaty, referring to the 
Constitution as “nothing more than the draught of a plan, nothing but a 
dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it, by the voice of 
the people, speaking through the several state conventions.”75  That was
where interpreters were entitled to look for original meaning.  But Madison 
also would have repudiated—and perhaps even “refudiated”76—the idea
that original meaning could be ascertained simply by reverting to 
preexisting linguistic sources to ascertain what the Constitution meant. 
Madison also believed that resort to external authorities antedating the 
actual experience of Revolutionary constitutionmaking would be of limited 
value to Americans, as he made clear in his opening essay as Helvidius 
in 1793, in which he criticized Alexander Hamilton’s tacit reliance on
Locke and Montesquieu to support a broad reading of executive power.77 
74. One could also criticize Justice Scalia’s abuse of language in one other respect.
Setting up powers and rights as a dichotomy—the activity must be one thing or the 
other—also falsifies how some commentators at the time viewed the relation between these
two mixed modes of characterizing aspects of governance.  As James Hutson has argued 
in a review of the American understanding of constitutional rights, the two words were 
often used synonymously in the political writings of the era.  The existence of a right 
presupposed the capacity—the power—to exercise it.  James H. Hutson, The Bill of
Rights and the American Revolutionary Experience, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS: THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND LAW—1791 AND 1991, at 62, 91–95 (Michael 
J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991). 
75. James Madison, Speech in Congress on the Jay Treaty (Apr. 6, 1796), in
JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS, supra note 45, at 568, 574. 
 76. Henry Alford, The 10 Things To Talk About This Weekend, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 2010, at E7, available at 2010 WLNR 14580390 (“Sarah Palin uses word ‘refudiate,’ 
then likens her word-coining ways to Shakespeare’s.”). 
77. James Madison, Helvidius No. I (Aug. 1793), in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS, 
supra note 45, at 537, 540. 
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In a typically understated way, Madison mused about the problem of
employing venerated European writers who labored under the disadvantage 
“of having written before these subjects were illuminated by the events 
and discussions which distinguish a very recent period”—meaning the
Revolution.78 Or again, had Locke “written by the lamp which truth now
presents to lawgivers,” he might not have conceded so easily that the
categories of executive and federative power were “hardly to be separated 
into distinct hands.”79  That “lamp,” of course, was a second reference to
Revolutionary constitutionmaking.  Far from thinking that the provisions 
of the Constitution could be understood by reference to some preexisting
set of understandings and definitions, Madison’s originalist approach to
interpretation presupposed that the document could only be understood
in light of the historical experience of its framing. 
Of course, under the rubric of public meaning originalism, Madison’s
particular concerns, experiences, and insights have no special relevance
to the inquiry—except as they illustrate more general linguistic usage— 
and recognizing his authorial agency in drafting the Constitution, The 
Federalist, and the Bill of Rights would lead us hopelessly down the 
treacherous path of political subjectivity.  Still, I have learned a great
deal about how the Constitution was framed, ratified, and understood by 
immersing myself in Madison’s writings these past decades, and I happen to
think that your originalism, whenever or however you practice it, would 
benefit from similar attention.  This is neither faint-hearted originalism,
as practiced by Justice Scalia, nor an originalism that is an intellectual
feint.  It is simply the best way I know to think about what the Constitution 
originally meant.  Spending a little time with Locke on language will not
do you any harm, either.  If it worked for Madison, it might help us too.
78. Id.
79. Id.  It is important to note here that Madison read the important chapter on 
prerogative in the Second Treatise to mean—in my view correctly—that the rationale
that accepted the merger of ministerial (executive) and federative power remained
subject to revision and control by the legislature; in other words, prerogative, whatever 
its origins and character, could not be viewed as an independent source of executive 
authority.
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